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Parricide as Self-Defense
Mavis J. Van Sambeek*
In the 1970s courts started recognizing self-defense as a legal
defense for women who kill to protect themselves from brutal
partners., This defense, however, has not been extended to bat-
tered children who kill their parents to protect themselves from
abuse.2 The problems of child abuse and parricide3 have existed
for a long time4 but only recently has either received much atten-
tion.5 This article will examine the link between child abuse and
parricide, compare the battered child who kills with the battered
woman who kills, and advocate a self-defense defense for abused
children who commit parricide to prevent further abuse.
Section I presents an overview of the incidence of child abuse
and parricide. Section II discusses how the relationship between
parricide and child abuse has been virtually ignored by the legal
community. Section III proposes a self-defense theory for parri-
cide cases and analyzes the three reported parricide cases. Section
IV profiles the typical child who commits parricide; it also answers
some objections to the defense by showing that criminal law theo-
ries of punishment are not furthered by convicting children who
commit parricide to protect themselves from abuse and that the
self-defense rationale is met in such cases.
I. Incidence of Child Abuse and Children's Responses
The startlingly high rate of child abuse is well-documented.6
Estimates suggest that over one million abusive incidents occur in
* B.A., North Dakota State University (1985); J.D., University of Minnesota
Law School (1989). Jo would be proud.
1. Greggory W. Morris, The Kids Next Door: Sons and Daughters Who Kill
Their Parents 154 (1985).
2. Id
3. The murder of a parent by his or her child.
4. See Mortimore v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, 161 P. 766 (1916); Mildred Daley
Pagelow, Family Violence 148-56 (1984); Edmund Pearson, The Trial of Lizzie Bor-
den (1937).
5. Pagelow, supra note 4, at 156-63. For a discussion of the child welfare
movement, see id at 207-08.
6. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 1, at 21; Pagelow, supra note 4, at 49-53.
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the United States every year.7 How do abused children react to or
cope with years of abuse? Most endure it.8 Tragically, some of
these children who stay and take the abuse resort to violence as a
problem-solving mechanism. 9 After witnessing the use of violence
by their parent or parents to solve problems, quiet dissent, or re-
lease tension, abused children sometimes learn to use violence in
their own dealings with others.XO Other children who stay and en-
dure abuse become withdrawn and use fantasy and denial to cope
with the problem." "Recent reports suggest that severely abused
children may employ defenses of denial and fantasy to such an ex-
tent that multiple personalities or psychosis results."' 2
While most abused children stay and withstand the violence,
many run away from home.i3 One source reports that more than
one million adolescents run away each year.' 4 "Most of these kids
did not flee warm, loving families .... 'The reason we have run-
aways is because we have a lot of abused kids who are trying to
escape a violent environment.' "15
This article focuses on the small number of abused children
who neither endure the abuse nor run away. The children in this
7. Morris, supra note 1, at 165; Anne Johnson, Parents Who Fail To Protec 5
Law & Inequality 359, 360 n.12 (1987) (citing John E. B. Meyers, The Legal Re-
sponse to Child Abuse: In the Best Interests of Children?, 24 J. Farn. L. 149, 169-70
(1985)). See also Pagelow, supra note 4, at 37-68 (discussion of estimated extent of
child abuse).
8. Lois Timnick, Fatal Means for Children to End Abuse, L.A. Times, Aug. 31,
1986, § 2, at 3, col. 1.
9. Paul Mones, The Relationship Between Child Abuse and Parricide: An
Overview, in Unhappy Families 35 (Eli H. Newberger & Richard Bourne eds. 1985);
Timnick, supra note 8, at 3. For a discussion of the parallels of child maltreatment
and juvenile delinquency, see Ronald Flowers, Children and Criminality: The Child
as Victim and Perpetrator (1986). Even when children are not directly assaulted,
witnessing abuse has a negative effect on them. Substantial evidence reveals strik-
ing correlations between spousal abuse and various forms of violent offenses com-
mitted by juveniles who witnessed such abuse. Gail Goodman & Mindy Rosenberg,
The Child Witness to Family Violence: Clinical and Legal Considerations, in Do-
mestic Violence on Trial: Psychological and Legal Dimensions of Family Violence
97, 99-102 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed. 1987).
10. Mones, supra note 9, at 35; Timnick, supra note 8, at 3.
11. Mones, supra note 9, at 35; Timnick, supra note 8, at 3. See also Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 5, 1987, at 6.
12. Goodman & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 103 (citing J. Fagan & P. McMa-
hon, Incipient Multiple Personality in Children: Four Cases, 172 J. Nervous &
Mental Disease 26-36 (1984)).
13. Timnick, supra note 8, at 3.
14. Telephone interview with Don Griffin, Associate Director of the National
Network of Runaways & Youth Services (Dec. 9, 1988).
15. Morris supra note 1, at 154. Accord Pagelow, supra note 4, at 372. See also
Timnick, supra note 8, at 3, where one commentator estimates that the majority of
"missing children" are in fact children fleeing abuse and that the majority of run-
aways in shelters left home to escape abuse.
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group end the abuse by killing the abuser.16 Each year about 400
parricides occur in the United States.17 Though accounting for
only about two percent of all homicides in the United States each
year, this is not an insignificant statistic. Indeed, parricides and
their headlined reports are increasing.' 8 Starting with the Richard
Jahnke case19 in 1984 and continuing to the Cheryl Pierson case2o
in 1987, nationwide reporting of parricide cases has pushed parri-
cide into the public eye. The questions being raised are many and
broad: Why do some children kill their parents? Are most parri-
cides precipitated by child abuse? What is the profile of a child
who commits parricide? Why has the relationship between parri-
cide and child abuse been virtually ignored by the legal commu-
nity? Can parricide as a reaction to child abuse be justified as an
act of self-defense? The following sections will try to answer these
questions.
II. Lack of Attention by the Legal Community
Despite the attention parricide has been receiving in newspa-
pers, magazines, and medical/psychological journals, the relation-
ship between parricide and child abuse is virtually unexplored in
the legal community.21 It is unclear why legal commentators have
not addressed this topic, particularly since parricide is not a recent
phenomenon22 and is such a harrowing crime. In addition, the
growing awareness of child abuse and the tremendous amount of
attention given to recent battered women self-defense cases23 point
to the need for direction from the legal community in this emerg-
ing area of criminal law. There are possible explanations for this
lack of awareness of any relationship between parricide and child
abuse. They include an historical acceptance of a parent's right to
"discipline" his or her child, a continuing presumption that parents
do what is best for their children, the distastefulness of both child
abuse and parricide, and the fact that parricides usually are not
committed in the "typical" self-defense situation.
16. Timnick, supra note 8, at 3.
17. Nancy Blodgett, Sef-Defense: Parricide Defendants Cite Sexual Abuse as
Justification, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 36, 37; Marcia Chambers, Children Citing
Self-Defense in Murder of Parents, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, § 1, at 38, col. 1,
Timnick, supra note 8, at 3.
18. See Morris, supra note 1, at 152; Mones, supra note 9, at 32.
19. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984). Jahnke was the first parricide
case to receive wide attention.
20. Nat'1 L.J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 6.
21. Morris, supra note 1, at 23, 147, 153; Mones, supra note 9, at 31, 35, 36, 38.
22. See supra p. 87.
23. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 380 (N.J. 1984).
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Historically children were viewed as the property of their
parents.24 "Discipline" was a family matter and parents had
nearly unlimited discretion.2 5 While in the past century there has
been an increased interest in and a movement towards protecting
children's rights,26 the presumption that the parent-child relation-
ship is a confidential one still survives. This presumption includes
the parents' license to raise their children without state
interference. 27
Ideally parents act in their children's best interests. Tragi-
cally for the one million-plus abused children in this country, the
ideal is not reality. The historical acceptance of children as prop-
erty and the continuing presumption that parents ensure their
children's safety and well-being may serve to cloak child abuse.28
Perhaps they have prevented legal scholars from acknowledging
the self-defense possibility in parricide cases.
The legal community appears reluctant to address these dis-
tressing issues for another reason.29 Child abuse is a very dis-
turbing subject and most people would rather not acknowledge it.
In addition, parricide is an especially shocking crime.30 Many peo-
ple, including defense attorneys, are simply unable to believe that
a child could be so abused that murdering his or her parent is the
only option.3 ' Yet, the number of children killed and maimed by
abuse is staggering3 2 and suggests that self-defense sometimes
could have been used to prevent the harm.
Finally, perhaps self-defense is not used more often in parri-
cide cases because parricides in self-defense do not fit the classic
self-defense situation. Clearly self-defense would be asserted if
the child killed in immediate reaction to imminent abuse, for ex-
ample, if a child killed his or her father who was beating him or
her with a baseball bat. Unfortunately, most parricides appear to
be premeditated murder because the child strikes when the abuser
24. Pagelow, supra note 4, at 148-56.
25. Id,
26. Id at 156-63.
27. 1 Wayne LaFave & Austin Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.6(a) (1986).
28. Flowers, supra note 9, at 12 (stating that the presumption that parents are
acting in their children's best interests gives way only when extreme abuse is
shown).
29. Morris, supra note 1, at 153-54.
30. Gerald Lubenow, When Kids Kill their Parents, Newsweek, June 27, 1983,
at 35; Mones, supra note 9, at 31.
31. Morris, supra note 1, at 153, 159, 165.
32. Morris, supra note 1, at 165-66 (citing FBI statistics that place the number
of children killed by their parents at 500-600 per year and the National Association
for the Prevention of Child Abuse "estimates that 5000 children are murdered an-
nually by their parents but the deaths are concealed").
[Vol. 7:87
PARRICIDE AS SELF-DEFENSE
is vulnerable. In the classic parricide situation, the imminent dan-
ger is more subtle and is only perceptible to an abused child.
Whatever the reason for the lack of attention given to the use
of self-defense in parricide cases, the relationship between child
abuse and parricide has been in the legal closet for too long. The
legal community must acknowledge that the problem of child
abuse exists, recognize that parricide exists, realize that there is an
amazingly high correlation between the two,3 3 and understand
that parricide can be justified as self-defense. Parricides too often
are portrayed as evidence of increasingly violent youth.34 As dis-
tressing as the idea of parricide is, equally disturbing is the extent
and duration of abuse these children have suffered. Homicide is a
crime, but so is child abuse. Abused children who commit parri-
cide are presented as criminals, yet surely they are victims first.3 5
HI. Parricide in Self-Defense
Recently some defense attorneys have sought to exculpate
abused children who commit parricide by advancing a self-defense
theory.36 The theory is based on the one employed in battered-wo-
men-who-kill self-defense cases.3 7 "Even though self-defense is
being raised more often both by abused children who kill a parent
and by battered women who kill their mates,"38 the defense re-
mains difficult to establish.3 9 Most children accused of killing
their parents are convicted,4 often after pleading guilty to man-
slaughter.41 Thus, only three battered children self-defense cases
have reached the appellate level.42
A. The Elements of Self-Defense
Homicide is justifiable as self-defense if the homicidal act was
caused by a reasonable belief that the actor was in imminent dan-
33. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. Morris, supra note 1, at 151-53; Mones, supra note 9, at 31.
35. Mones, upra note 9, at 38.
36. Blodgett, upra note 17, at 36.
37. See generally Elizabeth Bochnak, Case Preparation and Development in
Women's Self-Defense Cases: Theory and Practice (1981).
38. Blodgett, upra note 17, at 37.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Morris, supra note 1, at 153-54 (quoting Paul Mones who states that many
times lawyers induce their clients to accept a plea bargain because either they do
not see the abuse and realize its worth as part of a self-defense theory or they do
not want to deal with it).
42. The three reported cases are People v. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 484
N.Y.S.2d 328 (1985); State v. Holden, No. 49566, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26,
1985); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984).
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ger of unlawful death or serious bodily harm, that the use of force
was necessary to repel the attack, and that the amount of force
used was reasonable.4 3 "It is only just that one who is unlawfully
attacked by another.. .should be able to take reasonable steps to
defend himself from physical harm."44 Self-defense is a complete
defense to homicide and the defendant is not guilty of any crime if
the fact-finder determines that the defendant was reasonable in
his or her belief about the imminence of the danger and the neces-
sity for deadly force.4 5 Most states apply an objective standard of
reasonableness and view the issue from what a reasonable person
would do in like circumstances. 46 A minority position applies a
subjective standard of reasonableness and only requires an honest
belief in the need for self-defense.47
The difficulty in applying self-defense to a parricide case is
determining reasonableness: whether the child reasonably be-
lieved he or she was in imminent danger and whether he or she
reasonably believed deadly force was necessary. 48 In determining
the reasonableness of the child's beliefs, knowledge of the abuse
factor is critical to gain an understanding of the child's perception
of his or her need to use self-defense. The use of evidence of an
abusive relationship shows the reasonableness of an abuse victim's
deadly attack on the abuser and is premised on the idea that a
homicide in response to abuse is understandable to jurors, and
therefore reasonable as self-defense.49 Thus, it is vital that jurors
are informed of the child's experiences as an abuse victim.
B. Meeting the Elements
There are strong similarities between abused women who kill
43. LaFave & Scott, supra note 27, § 5.7.
44. Id. § 5.7(a).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 5.7(b).
47. Id, See also Model Penal Code, § 3.04(1) (1985). Regardless of which stan-
dard of reasonableness is used, the abuse factor would be relevant to reasonable-
ness. If a subjective standard is used, the abuse would be relevant to the child's
own belief in the need for deadly force. If an objective standard is applied, the
abuse would be relevant to whether the belief in the need for deadly force was rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Cf. Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill
Or To Be Killed, 32 Hastings L.J. 895, 919-20 (1981) (wife battering relevant on
question of reasonableness whether objective or subjective standard of reasonable-
ness is applied in self-defense case).
48. Cf. Charles Ewing, Battered Women Who Kill 47 (1987) (difficulty in bat-
tered women self-defense cases is establishing reasonableness of fear of danger and
reasonableness of belief in need for deadly force); Note, supra note 47, at 920.
49. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1012-44 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
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their tormentors and abused children who commit parricide.50
Since battered women and children who respond with deadly force
are so similar,5 1 the use of the Battered Woman Syndrome 52 as
part of a self-defense argument for a woman who kills her batterer
is a suitable framework for a parricide defense.53
Battered women who kill their abusers, like children who
kill their abusive parents,5 4 usually have no prior criminal convic-
tions, have very low recidivism rates, and in general, do not pose a
threat to the rest of society.55 They have suffered ongoing abuse,
have received little help from society, and have few options.56 In
addition, many are more suicidal than homicidal.
The Battered Woman Syndrome is defined as "a series of
common characteristics that appear in women who are abused
physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by
the dominant male figure in their lives."57 Dr. Lenore Walker has
identified three stages in an abusive relationship.58 Phase one of
the battering cycle is the "tension-building stage," during which
the battering male engages in minor battering incidents and verbal
abuse. In this stage the woman attempts to be as placating and
passive as possible to avoid more serious violence.59
Phase two is the "acute battering incident" which occurs
when the tensions that have built up in stage one are released.60
This stage is characterized by the severe and uncontrolled nature
of the abuse.61 The trigger for the acute battering incident is usu-
ally some event in the batterer's life, but, sometimes the woman,
consciously or unconsciously, provokes the batterer to trigger the
inevitable severe incident in order to get it over with and reach
50. State v. Holden, No. 49566 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26, 1985). See also Jahnke,
682 P.2d at 996; Morris, supra note 1, at 7, 150; Mones, supra note 9, at 37.
51. Mones, supra note 9, at 37.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 57-69.
53. Mones, supra note 9, at 38.
54. For a profile of a battered child who kills the abuser see infra p. 104.
55. Battered Women and Criminal Justice: A Report of the Committee on Do-
mestic Violence and Incarcerated Women 3-4 (1987); Mones, supra note 9, at 15.
See also Ewing, supra note 48, at 23-40 (discussing battered women who kill as a
subset of battered women); Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 40-44
(1984).
56. Walker, supra note 55, at 40-44.
57. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984) (citing Lenore
Walker, The Battered Woman, at xv (1979)).
58. Dr. Walker has termed this phenomenon the "cycle theory of violence."
Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman 55-70 (1979).
59. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 193, 478 A.2d at 371 (citing Walker, supra note 58, at 56-59).
60. Id. (citing Walker, supra note 58, at 59).




Phase three is characterized by "extreme contrition and lov-
ing behavior" on the part of the battering male.63 During this pe-
riod of calm the batterer pleads for forgiveness and promises never
to batter again. He also may promise to seek professional help in
order to reform himself.64 The affection and contrition of the man
fade and the cycle starts again.65 As the cycle is repeated over and
over, the abuse in stage two escalates. 66
The cycle of abuse has psychological effects on the battered
woman including learned helplessness, depression, isolation, false
hope that the batterer will change, low self-esteem, belief in the
omnipotence of the batterer and futility of action, guilt, and belief
that leaving will provoke a more violent response.67 The psycho-
logical impacts are compounded by external social and economic
factors such as lack of financial resources, sex-role stereotypes, so-
cietal and familial pressures to remain in the relationship, inade-
quate responses from the police and courts, and lack of safe
alternatives for the battered woman and her children.68 This com-
bination of psychological, social, and economic factors prevent bat-
tered women from leaving the abusive relationship.69
The evidence of the Battered Woman Syndrome is used as
part of a self-defense theory in cases when women have killed
their abusive partners. In practice, an expert witness describes the
syndrome, testifies that the defendant suffered from it, and ex-
62. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984) (citing Walker,
supra note 58, at 59-65). A battered woman has no control over whether she will be
abused, but by triggering the event she feels she has some control over when and
why the incident occurs. Walker, supra note 58, at 60.
63. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 193-94, 478 A.2d at 371 (citing Walker, supra note 58, at 65).
64. Id. at 194, 478 A.2d at 371 (citing Walker, supra note 58, at 65-70).
65. Id. (citing Walker, supra note 58, at 65-70).
66. Ewing, supra note 48, at 51. See also Walker, supra note 55, at 97, 103; Com-
ment, SeUf-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Tria 20 Cal. W.L. Rev. 485,
486-87 (1984).
67. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 195-96, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (1984); Jean Bunyak,
Battered Women Who Kil" Civil Liability and the Admissibility of Battered Wo-
man's Syndrome Testimony, 4 Law & Inequality 603, 614 (1986); Ewing, supra note
48, at 52.
68. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 195-96, 478 A.2d at 372; Ewing, supra note 48, at 52; Com-
ment, supra note 66, at 488-89; Comment, The Battered Women's Syndrome De-
fense, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 337, 343-47 (1985).
69. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 195-96, 478 A.2d at 372. This combination also gives the bat-
tered woman a finely tuned perception of the batterer (i.e. she becomes able to tell
if the batterer will use "unusual"-more severe than in the past-force or vio-
lence). Id. at 196-97, 207, 378 A.2d at 372-73, 378; Bochnak, supra note 37, at 45; Ew-
ing, supra note 48, at 52; Bunyak, supra note 67, at 612-15; Comment, supra note 68,
at 352. For a discussion of this phenomenon in connection with battered children,
see infra p. 98.
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plains how her status as a battered woman affected her percep-
tions and behavior at the time of the killing.70 The Battered
Woman Syndrome is used to show the reasonableness of her belief
in the need for deadly force to protect herself from immediate
harm and to bolster her credibility. 71 Courts do admit Battered
Woman Syndrome testimony for its relevancy both to the immedi-
acy of the danger element of self-defense and to the reasonable-
ness of the amount of force used element of self-defense. 72
State v. Kelly 73 is a case illustrative of the battered woman
self-defense. The Kelly court held that expert testimony about the
Battered Woman Syndrome was relevant to a self-defense claim to
show the "honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's belief
that deadly force was necessary to protect her against death or se-
rious bodily harm."74
In Kelly, the defendant had stabbed her husband with a scis-
sors, was indicted for murder, and asserted that her action was in
self-defense.TS The defense called an expert to testify about the
Battered Woman Syndrome to help establish her self-defense
claim.76 The trial court ruled that such testimony was inadmissi-
ble, apparently believing that the testimony was offered as conclu-
sive evidence that the defendant's perception was reasonable. 77
The appellate court found that the expert testimony was relevant,
not to justify the defendant's perception, but to show the jury that
her belief was honest and reasonable.78 The court stated, "The dif-
ficulty with the expert testimony is that it sounds as if an expert is
giving knowledge to a jury about something the jury knows as well
as anyone else, namely, the reasonableness of a person's fear of im-
minent serious danger." 79 The court said that this testimony is ac-
tually intended to illuminate an area where the common
70. Ewing, supra note 48, at 51-53.
71. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 197-207, 478 A.2d at 375-78; Ewing, supra note 48, at 51-53;
Note, supra note 47, at 920-30. See Comment, supra note 68, at 361; Annotation,
Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Wo-
man Syndrome, 18 A.L.R.4th 1153 (1982).
72. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith
v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d 345,
455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 102
Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312
(1984). But see Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); State v.
Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
73. 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
74. Id. at 187, 478 A.2d at 368.
75. Id. at 187-88, 478 A.2d at 368.
76. Id. at 188, 478 A.2d at 368.
77. Id.
78. Id at 201, 205, 478 A.2d at 375, 377.
79. Id. at 206, 478 A.2d at 378.
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knowledge of the jury may be wrong and may lead to incorrect
conclusions.80 Finally, the court stated that an expert's knowledge
enables the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being
common myths,81 rather than common knowledge, and to con-
clude that the defendant's fear for her life was indeed objectively
reasonable.8 2
The court decided that the jury could have found that the de-
fendant met the elements of a self-defense claim when aided by
Battered Woman Syndrome testimony8 3 and reversed and re-
manded for retrial.8 4 This decision thus means that a battered wo-
man can establish self-defense as a legal defense. In order for this
defense to be successful, the defendant must present evidence of a
regular pattern of abuse, the defendant's claim that the abuser
made a new and different covert or overt threat which caused her
to believe she might be killed, and expert testimony on the Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome. This reasoning should be extended and
applied to parricide self-defense cases.8 5
C. Battered Children and Self-Defense: Abuse-Oriented
Strategy
Allowing parricide to be justified as self-defense will not cre-
ate a right for children to kill because of past mistreatment; it sim-
ply recognizes that an abused child can rationally and reasonably
find it impossible to survive without killing. It is a call for equal
and individualized treatment under the law.8 6
A description of the Battered Person Syndrome8 7 and the
history of child abuse are relevant to show the reasonableness of
both the belief in the immediacy of the danger and the belief in
the need for deadly force. In addition, the size and strength differ-
ences of the child and the abusing adult and social factors also af-
fect the reasonableness of the child's beliefs.
80. Id.
81. For example, battered women are free to leave the abusive relationship;
battered women are masochistic; since battered women stay in the relationship, the
abuse cannot be that bad. Id. at 192, 478 A.2d at 370.
82. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 206, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (1984).
83. Id. at 204-05, 478 A.2d at 377.
84. Id. at 187, 478 A.2d 368.
85. Mones, supra note 9, at 38.
86. Gail Rodwan, The Defense of Those Who Defend Themselves, 65 Mich. B.J.
64 (1986).
87. The term "Battered Person Syndrome" is used rather than "Battered Child
Syndrome" throughout this article because "Battered Child Syndrome" is a medical
term of art describing the physical symptoms of a child who has been abused. Sa-
muel Radbill, Children in a World of Violence: A History of Child Abuse, in The
Battered Child 17 (3d ed. C. Henry Kempe & Ray E. Helfer eds. 1980).
[Vol. 7:87
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In a parricide case, expert testimony about the Battered Per-
son Syndrome8 8 should be admitted because it meets the standards
for admission of expert testimony.8 9 As in the battered women
self-defense cases, evidence of a Battered Person Syndrome is use-
ful to bolster the defendant's credibility, 90 it explains why some-
one stays in an abusive relationship,9 1 and it shows that an abused
person's perceptions about the imminence of danger are reason-
able in a situation which would not seem dangerous to a
nonabused person.92
What do years of abuse do to a child? The Battered Person
Syndrome explains how abuse results in cumulative terror. An
abused child is in constant danger of battering. She or he may
have no control over when, why, or how the battering will occur;93
she or he only knows for certain that it will occur. Every time the
cycle of violence is repeated, the second stage violence is more se-
vere and the third stage calmness is shorter.94 Surely constant
danger of being subjected to bodily harm-which keeps escalat-
ing--constitutes imminent danger.95
In addition to explaining how a battered person is always in
imminent danger, the Battered Person Syndrome also reveals how
a battered person takes on a special perception: she or he knows
what the abuser is like and, although she or he cannot predict an
attack, she or he does know the usual character of the attack situa-
88. There is no reason to distinguish the term "Battered Woman Syndrome"
from "Battered Person Syndrome" because battered women share the same psycho-
logical characteristics as battered children. This article uses the terms synony-
mously. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
89. The criteria for admission of expert testimony are set forth in United States
v. Dyas, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977). The three crite-
ria are as follows:
(1) the intended testimony must cover matter beyond the ken of the
average juror; (2) the expert must be sufficiently knowledgeable that
his opinion will probably aid the trier of fact in their search for the
truth; and (3) expert testimony is inadmissible if the nature of the sub-
ject matter is such that it does not permit a reasonable opinion to be
asserted even by an expert.
Id. (citing McCormick on Evidence, § 13, at 29-31 (2d ed. 1972)). See also Bunyak,
supra note 67, at 622-27.
90. In this regard, the Syndrome shows the jurors that flight is not a possibility
and that the abuse really is severe enough that killing becomes logical and neces-
sary to escape death. Cf State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 201-02, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (1984).
91. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1027 (Wyo. 1984).
92. Id. at 1025 (Rose, J., dissenting).
93. For a discussion of the stages of the Battered Woman Syndrome, see supra
notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
94. Ewing, supra note 48, at 51.
95. Cf the Model Penal Code where the test for immediacy is loosened to re-
quire simply an honest belief. Model Penal Code, § 3.04 (1985). See also State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 201, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (1981).
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tion.96 The abuse pattern has become ritualistic, and even though
the severity of the abuse may change, the ritual does not.97 An
abuser can change the usual attack pattern almost imperceptibly
and the child will notice it; if something out of the ordinary hap-
pens, the child will pick up the cue and will know whether a new
threat is real and potentially lethal.98 This special perception can
show why the child kills this time and never did before. The
abused child has received some kind of threat from the abuser
which is completely new to the abusive relationship and she or he
kills to avoid having the threat carried out.99
Not only does the Battered Person Syndrome show that an
abuse victim is constantly in immediate danger and that an abuse
victim has a keen awareness of the abuser's ritual of abuse, it also
explains why someone stays in an abusive relationship.1 00 A natu-
ral question of jurors is why didn't the abuse victim simply leave
the abusive situation?011 As the Battered Person Syndrome dem-
onstrates, it is not easy to leave. As with Battered Woman Syn-
drome, the loving nature of the abuser during stage three gives the
child false hope that the abuser will reform and the abuse will
end. Thus, the cycle of abuse binds the child to the abusive rela-
tionship. The child grows up being abused and perceives the vio-
lence as normal, not realizing it is something from which she or
he should escape. Often the child sees the abuser as omnipotent,
believing that any resistance, including flight, is futile.102
The history of abuse causes constant danger and also changes
the child's entire outlook.10 3 An abused child has a skewed view
of the world. The law should treat a person as he or she is found
and consider individual circumstances.iO4 The abuse the child suf-
fered must be taken into account in parricide cases. The standard
of reasonableness for a self-defense defense must be what is rea-
96. Cf id.; Comment, supra note 68, at 351-52.
97. See Comment, supra note 68, at 351-52.
98. Cf. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 207, 478 A.2d at 378.
99. Cf. idc ; Comment, supra note 68, at 352 (citing Walker, supra note 55, at 40).
100. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1032 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
101. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 205, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (1984).
102. In addition to these psychological factors explaining why a person stays in
an abusive situation, there are numerous external social and economic factors
which also serve to bind the person to an abusive family relationship. See infra p.
100.
103. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1030-31 (Rose, J., dissenting).
104. Compare this idea with the "thin-skull rule" from Torts which requires that
one must take the victim as he or she is found. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts 292 (1984).
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sonable to an abuse victim. 0 5
The child's fear of harm will increase over time proportion-
ately to the increasing severity of the abuse. As the violence cycle
is repeated and each successive stage two is worse, the abused child
becomes more apprehensive. Finally, she or he reaches the point
where the fear of being killed becomes unbearable and she or he
will kill to survive.106 Thus, a situation which might not seem dan-
gerous to a nonabused person might rationally and reasonably be
perceived as such to an abused child.107
Another factor that bears on the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's beliefs in the need for deadly force and the imminence of
danger is the difference in size and strength between the child and
the abuser.' 0 8 It is important to realize that an unarmed adult
(particularly a male) can cause severe damage--even death-to a
child.l09
"The relative size and strength of the accused and deceased
are proper considerations in determining whether there was rea-
sonable apprehension of danger and whether the slayer used more
force than was necessary to defend himself against the threatened
danger."1 ' 0 Thus, if an overpowering abuser implicitly or explic-
itly threatens a small, vulnerable child, it is quite reasonable for
that child to see the threat as imminent danger of severe bodily
harm or death-particularly when the child has experienced the
abuser's rage in the past and knows that the harm increases with
each subsequent attack. If one is helpless to thwart such an attack
by physically overpowering the abuser, resort to deadly force is
justifiable self-defense.
A child's position in society also sheds light on the reasona-
bleness of an abused child's belief in the need for self-defense. Far
too often an abuse victim receives ineffective assistance or no
assistance at all. If the abuse is detected and/or reported, it still
105. See generally Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1011-44 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J.,
dissenting).
106. See Morris, supra note 1, at 165 (citing estimate that 5000 children die annu-
ally from child abuse). When one considers how many children die annually from
abuse, an abused child's fear of imminent danger is clearly legitimate.
107. But see Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1006.
108. Id at 1024 (Rose, J., dissenting).
109. Typically children who commit parricide are within the age range of 15-18;
however, they are still often physically smaller and remain vulnerable to deadly in-
jury at the abuser's hands. Morris, supra note 1, at 165. But size alone is not to-
tally determinative of vulnerability: "Learned helplessness" also prevents one from
realizing that there are options available and ways to help oneself. Walker, supra
note 58, at 42-54.
110. Note, supra note 47, at 924 (citing 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide §§ 159, 291
(1968); People v. Collins, 189 Cal. App. 2d. 575, 589-90, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504, 514 (1961)).
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can persist unchecked because outside agents do not effectively aid
the abuse victim."' Police and courts are loath to intervene in
family disputes and fear intervention will disrupt family units.112
Also, the nonabusing parent is often also abused by the batterer
and is too afraid to intervene.1 1 3
Not only does the child continue to suffer because of inade-
quate responses from external actors, but she or he is also in a po-
sition of relative powerlessness. A child is very dependent on
home life emotionally and financially."i 4 It is not easy to sever
blood ties and flee one's family, even if there is abuse in the fam-
ily.ii5 In addition, it is very hard for a child to make his or her
own way in the world. Where can an abused child go? There are
virtually no shelters for abused children," 6 and most of these chil-
dren have no job skills or are too young to seek legitimate employ-
ment to support themselves.
As with women who kill their battering partners, parricide
committed in reaction to child abuse can be seen as self-preserva-
tion and therefore justifiable as self-defense. Courts should recog-
nize a self-defense defense for children who commit parricide in
response to abuse.
D. The Parricide Cases
Richard Jahnke, 16, shot and killed his father in November
1982.117 He had been the victim of physical abuse since he was
two." 8 His father had also sexually abused Richard's younger sis-
ter and beat his mother repeatedly." 9 Richard reported the abuse
to his ROTC instructor and to the sheriff but neither took any
action.' 20
On the night of the homicide, Richard received a severe beat-
ing from his father. According to Richard, his father told him he
was a "shit" and said "I'm going to get rid of you, you bastard."''
Richard felt he had to take action to "protect his sister who was
111. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1019, 1021-23 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 1044 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
112. Johnson, supra note 7, at 362-63; Pagelow, supra note 4, at 354.
113. Johnson, supra note 7, at 380 (discussing reasons a nonabusing parent may
fail to protect).
114. Mones, supra note 9, at 36-37. Some abused children do run away and find
their new life equally harrowing. See Pagelow, supra note 4, at 356-58, 372.
115. Mones, supra note 9, at 36-37.
116. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1011 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id at 1015 (Rose, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1018-19, 1020-21 (Rose, J., dissenting).
120. Id at 1027 (Rose, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1015 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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hysterical when the mother and father left for dinner."122 Believ-
ing he had nowhere and no one to turn to for help, Richard, after
positioning a number of weapons throughout the house as
"backup," lay in wait in the garage armed with a 12 gauge shot-
gun.123 When the Jahnkes returned from dinner, Mr. Jahnke got
out of the car and "stomped" toward the garage.124 As his father
approached the garage door, Richard, who knew that when his fa-
ther "stomped" he was angry and likely to beat someone, shot and
killed him.125
At the trial, Richard's attorney tried to show how the lifelong
abuse supported his theory of self-defense. 126 The judge refused to
admit testimony from a forensic psychiatrist' 27 and Richard was
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to five to
fifteen years.128 On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that the expert testimony intended to support Richard's self-de-
fense theory was inadmissible. The court deemed it irrelevant be-
cause it said there was no showing of a self-defense situation,129
and therefore there was no reason to decide the reasonableness el-
ement of self-defense.' 30 In addition, the court emphasized the de-
fense attorney's failure to make a sufficient offer of proof on
whether the testimony was relevant to reasonableness.131
The Wyoming court narrowly construed a self-defense situa-
tion to only those instances where the circumstances show an ac-
tual confrontation or threat of assault at the time of the killing32
This view is contrary to the view that self-defense is available if a
person reasonably believes self-defense is necessary.'3 3
In the ordinary self-defense situation involving an actual as-
sault, the jury can easily judge reasonableness because they can
understand the perception of the accused at the moment of cri-





126. Id. at 993.
127. Id
128. Id. at 994-95. The sentence was commuted by the Wyoming governor. L.A.
Times, Oct. 18, 1985, § 1, at 10, col. 3.
129. Id. at 1007, 1010.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1007.
132. Id. at 1006. The court also misconstrued the self-defense theory. The court
thought the theory was that abuse victims have a special defense exclusive of the
traditional self-defense. Id at 996.
133. LaFave & Scott, supra note 27, § 5.7(a).
134. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1014 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
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tion, where there is no actual assault at the time of the homicide,
the jury is not able to judge reasonableness in the same easy, com-
mon sense way. In these unusual cases, it is much more difficult
for jurors to place themselves in the defendant's shoes and decide
whether it was reasonable to believe that he or she would be killed
or receive serious bodily harm unless he or she resorted to deadly
force.135 Therefore, testimony about the history of abuse; any new
threats, actual or implied, by the abuser; the defendant's statement
that he or she believed death was probable on this occasion; and
the Battered Person Syndrome is necessary to allow the jury to de-
termine if the defendant acted in self-defense.
In People v. Cruickshank ,136 Dawn Cruickshank, a 17-year-
old girl, killed her father in the garage of her home. 137 Her par-
ents were separated and the separation agreement allowed her fa-
ther to visit her in the garage, but he could not enter the house.138
Dawn had been sexually abused by her father for years, 3 9 and tes-
timony about the abuse was admitted at trial.140 She testified that
she feared sexual abuse the night she killed her father.141 The
judge instructed the jury that the murder would be justified if
they found that she acted to prevent a rape.142 The jury and the
appellate court were not convinced by the evidence of abuse that
Dawn could have reasonably feared rape.143 Dawn was convicted
of first degree manslaughter and given a prison sentence of two to
seven years.144
The Cruickshank court did admit abuse evidence to show rea-
sonableness and instructed the jury on justification; however, it
seems likely that the jury's view of the reasonableness of her be-
lief would have changed had they been given more information
about the effects of abuse and the Battered Person Syndrome.
Again, the abuse victim's world is not common knowledge with
which a jury may fairly determine the reasonableness of the per-
ception that deadly force was necessary for protection. How can a
jury say no reasonable person in like circumstances would have ac-
135. Id. at 1016 (Rose, J., dissenting).
136. 105 A.D.2d 325, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1985), order offd by, People v. Dawn Ma-
ria C., 67 N.Y.2d 625, 490 N.E.2d 530, 499 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1986).
137. Id at 326, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
138. Id at 327, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 331.




143. Id. at 332-33, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36.
144. Id. at 328, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
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ted in the same way if they do not understand the cycle of violence
and the true circumstances involved?
The final reported parricide case is State v. Holden 145 On
June 14, 1984, Gary Holden killed his father with an axe.' 46 The
trial court refused to allow a psychiatrist to testify regarding the
Battered Person Syndrome. 47 The defendant said his self-defense
theory required expert testimony to show the reasonableness of
his belief.148 The appellate court rejected this contention and held
that the jury's determination could not be based on the "stereo-
type" of a "typical" battered child.149
The appellate court's analysis focused on battered women
self-defense cases. Relying on State v. (Kathy) Thomas,150 the
Holden court held that expert testimony on Battered Woman Syn-
drome was irrelevant and immaterial to a self-defense claim, was a
subject within the jury's understanding, was not sufficiently devel-
oped to be expert testimony, and was too prejudicial.151
The court believed that the defense provided sufficient evi-
dence of the abuse Gary suffered, exclusive of the expert testi-
mony, to allow the jury to consider whether he had a bona fide
belief of imminent danger or great bodily harm that would have
justified his use of deadly force.'5 2 The court would have allowed
expert testimony based only on direct observations, rather than on
"typical facts." 5 3
Here too, perhaps the jury would have been better able to
place themselves in the defendant's position and see the reasona-
bleness of his actions had they been allowed to hear testimony
about the Battered Person Syndrome rather than simply isolated
testimony of abuse. In light of the assertion that the Battered Per-
son Syndrome is relevant to whether a defendant acted in self-de-
fense, coupled with the growing acceptance of the Battered Person
Syndrome among the scientific and legal communities, and the
lack of understanding of jurors in this area, it seems that the basis
for the Holden opinion [i.e. the (Kathy) Thomas opinion] needs to
be reexamined.
145. No. 49566, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26, 1985)
146. Id, at 2.
147. Id,
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id at 3, 6.
150. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
151. State v. Holden, No. 49566, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26, 1985).
152. Id, at 4.
153. Id, at 5, 6.
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IV. Profile of a Child Who Commits Parricide and Answers to Some
Objections
Child abuse and mental illness provoke most of the parricides
committed in the United States, with child abuse being the pri-
mary cause.l 54 Abused children who commit parricide to end
abuse do not have the typical characteristics of juvenile delin-
quents. 5 5 Indeed, many resemble a suicidal profile more closely
than a homicidal profile.' 56
Children who commit parricide typically come from white,
middle or upper-middle class families; are generally good students;
usually have no history of delinquency or violent, assaultive behav-
ior; and have suffered from a pattern of abuse.157 Most feel
trapped in an unescapable situation and develop a "concentration
camp" mentality where they feel they have no options and cannot
leave.1i 8 In addition, these children pose no threat to the rest of
society and are manageable once the abusive parent has been
killed.'s9
Allowing a battered child who commits parricide to claim
self-defense does not thwart the purposes of the criminal law. Con-
victing an abused child who kills to protect him or herself does not
further the criminal law theories of punishment and the rationale
underlying self-defense is met in such cases.1 60 If the goal of pun-
ishment is seen as rehabilitation,' 6 ' convicting an abuse victim who
ends the abuse with parricide will not further that goal. A child
who commits parricide does not fit a criminal profile; once the
154. Morris, supra note 1, at 151, 293; Blodgett, supra note 17, at 36; Timnick,
supra note 8, at 2. In parricide cases, the question becomes whether the abused
child committed parricide because of a belief that she or he was in danger or
whether the cumulative effect of abuse and resulting problems caused the child to
lash out in a murderous rage. Morris, supra note 1, at 293; Timnick, supra note 8,
at 2-3. This article deals with the former situation and advocates allowing a tradi-
tional self-defense claim by the parricide defendant.
155. Marcia Chambers, Child's Self Defense Growing in Murder Cases, L.A.
Daily J., Oct. 17, 1986, § 2, at p. 1, col. 3; Mones, supra note 9, at 36; Timnick, supra
note 8, at 3. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1026 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J.,
dissenting).
156. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1026 (Rose, J., dissenting); Mones, supra note 9, at 36.
157. Chambers, supra note 155, at 1; Timnick, supra note 8, at 3. See Jahnke,
682 P.2d at 1015, 1026 (Rose, J., dissenting) See also People v. Cruickshank, 105
A.D.2d 325, 334, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 336-37 (1985).
158. Timnick, supra note 8, at 3. See Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1022, 1023 (Rose, J.,
dissenting).
159. Mones, supra note 9, at 37.
160. Cf. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d at 335, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 337 (1985).
161. Under this theory, "punishment" is giving the convicted person appropriate
treatment to rehabilitate him or her and return him or her to society so reformed




abuser has been killed, the child's criminal career has most likely
ended.162 Rehabilitation is supposed to prevent recidivism, 6 3 but
in the abused child self-defense case, there is generally no danger
of recidivism.164
If the goal of punishment is seen as incapacitation, 6 5 convict-
ing an abuse victim who ends the abuse by slaying the abuser will
not further the goal. The abused child who kills his or her abusive
parent does not pose a threat to society at large. Once the abuse is
ended and the child ceases to be an abused child in constant dan-
ger, he or she is unlikely to murder again.'6 6
Convicting the abused child will not aid the deterrence167
goal of criminal punishment either. If one sees specific deter-
rence 6 8 as the goal of criminal punishment, convicting a child who
commits parricide in self-defense will not advance that goal. Such
a child is not a recidivist and does not need punishment to discour-
age him or her from committing another crime.
Even if one sees general deterrence 6 9 as the goal of criminal
punishment, conviction will not further the goal. Other children
will not start committing random, thoughtless parricides if a self-
defense defense is allowed in the case of the abused child who per-
ceives danger and moves to prevent it. The self-defense elements
still have to be met; the history of abuse is simply to show the rea-
sonableness of the abuse victim's beliefs. The defense is not a gen-
eral license to kill parents for one time incidents; an ongoing
abusive relation must be shown and the traditional self-defense el-
ements must be met. In other words, the parricide must have been
prompted by a reasonable belief that the child was in danger and
deadly force was necessary to prevent it.
The final goal posited as a theory of criminal punishment is
retribution.170 Inherent in that goal is an idea that a person who
162. People v. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 334, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 336 (1985).
163. LaFave & Scott, supra note 27, § 1.5(a)(3).
164. Mones, supra note 9, at 37.
165. Under this theory, society seeks to protect itself from persons deemed dan-
gerous because of past criminal conduct by isolating convicted criminals. LaFave &
Scott, supra note 27, § 1.5(a)(2).
166. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 334, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 336 (1985).
167. The deterrence goal can be subdivided into general deterrence and specific
deterrence. LaFave & Scott, supra note 27, §§ 1.5(a)(1), (4).
168. Under this theory, punishment aims to deter the particular criminal from
committing further crimes by giving him or her such an unpleasant experience that
he or she will not risk enduring it again. Id, § 1.5(a)(1).
169. Under this theory, punishing one criminal is supposed to deter others from
committing crimes because they become aware of the unpleasantness that attaches
to criminal conduct. Id § 1.5(a)(4).
170. Under this theory, society punishes criminals because they are deserving of
it since they caused others to suffer. Id § 1.5(a)(6). While LaFave and Scott also
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commits a crime should pay for it.171 In the abusive situation,
however, a child who has endured years of suffering at the hands
of a battering parent has already paid. As victims of abuse, they
should not be made to suffer further punishment.
Our criminal justice system recognizes that one has the right
to protect oneself from unlawful harm (or the threat of harm) at
the hands of another.172 Child abuse is unlawful harm. Thus, al-
lowing a child who commits parricide to protect him or herself
from further, more severe abuse at the hands of the battering par-
ent to justify the slaying as self-defense meets the rationale behind
allowing self-defense. If child welfare agencies and the legal sys-
tem fail to intervene and rescue the child from the abuser, the
child who protects him or herself from further harm at the hands
of the batterer should be seen as acting in self-defense. 73
V. Conclusion
Abused children who commit parricide are victims, not
criminals. If the legal system does not allow a self-defense justifi-
cation for their actions, they will be doubly victimized-once by
the abuse and once by the system that is supposed to protect them.
Until society better protects children from child abuse, children
will be forced to strike out in order to protect themselves. Self-
defense must be as available as a defense to parricide as it is for
any other homicide.
list education as a theory of criminal punishment, they state that "the educational
function of punishment is important as to crimes that are not generally known,
often misunderstood, or inconsistent with current morality." Id. § 1.5(a)(5).
171. Id
172. Id. § 5.7(a).
173. Some parricides can be justified as defense of others. Often a child will fi-
nally slay the abuser when the battering is inflicted on a younger sibling. See
Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1015 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 7:87
